Twenty-seven basis points. That’s the annualized net loss rate for Blue Owl Capital Corporation’s flagship BDC, OBDC, since its inception in April 2016 through year-end 2025. Over a nine-year window that included a global pandemic, a period of aggressive Federal Reserve rate hikes, and the subsequent easing cycle, the fund lost an average of $2.70 for every $10,000 lent per year (https://finchannel.com/moodys-upgrades-blue-owl-bdcs-to-baa2/129475/american-business-trends/2026/02/).
Blue Owl Capital’s broader direct lending platform, which includes OCIC alongside OBDC, posted an even lower number: 7 basis points annualized over the same period. That translates to roughly 70 cents per $10,000 per year in realized credit losses.
What Built the Number
Loss rates don’t happen by accident. Several structural factors contributed to Blue Owl Capital’s track record. OBDC’s borrowers carried a weighted average EBITDA of $229 million, companies large enough to weather downturns through refinancing rather than default. OCIC’s borrowers were larger still, averaging $296 million (https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/blue-owl-capital-corporation-upgraded-to-baa2-by-moodys-93CH-4461248).
Portfolio seniority reinforced borrower quality. 74% of OBDC’s investments sat in first-lien and unitranche positions, while OCIC held 88% at that level of seniority. Loan-to-value ratios hovered between 30% and 40%, placing substantial equity beneath the firm’s debt positions. Moody’s cited these factors in upgrading both BDCs to Baa2 in January 2026: borrower scale, structural seniority, and conservative leverage.
What the Track Record Doesn’t Include
Moody’s was careful to qualify its findings. Neither OBDC nor OCIC has operated through a prolonged, severe recession. The nine-year window is substantial and includes real stress: COVID-19 disrupted borrower operations globally, and the Fed’s rate increases between 2022 and 2023 were the most aggressive in four decades. But a multi-year contraction with sustained unemployment and depressed consumer spending hasn’t been part of the picture.
That caveat matters for investors projecting future loss experience. The 27-basis-point figure is a fact about the past, not a forecast. The structural factors that produced it (borrower size, LTV discipline, first-lien seniority) are the more relevant question for what happens during conditions that haven’t yet been tested.
